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Waiver and Estoppel in Louisiana Insurance Law
The doctrines of waiver and estoppel have been extensively
applied in the field of insurance law. These principles have been
used to circumvent the harsh effects of a strict enforcement of
conditions in insurance policies, particularly the doctrine of warranty.1 Another use of waiver and estoppel has been to soften
the impact upon insurance contracts of rules applicable to contracts in general. 2 One writer has observed that the great increase in the use of waiver and estoppel in the field of insurance
cases during the present century may be due to the fact that insurance has changed from a custom-made service bought only
by sophisticated businessmen to a brand name commodity demanded by untrained consumers a This Comment is limited to
an examination of the principles of waiver and estoppel and
application of these doctrines in insurance law, particularly in
Louisiana.
Waiver
Waiver may generally be defined as the intentional relinquishment of a known power or privilege. 4 The doctrine of waiver is
conventional in nature and arises by agreement. Therefore,
some type of intention to waive, either express or implied, is
necessary.' In the law of insurance, waiver most frequently involves the relinquishment by an insurer of a power of avoiding
liability under an insurance policy. Only powers or privileges
of requiring that all incorrect statements be material in order to avoid the
contract, whether warranties or representations, and regardless of the absence or
presence of an. intent to deceive.
Such legislation would do away entirely with
the concept of warranty in insurance contracts, which might be objectionable as
a restriction of the parties' freedom to contract. However, in view of the fact
that all but fraudulent warranties have been effectively abrogated by the
present statute, perhaps the slight additional infringement on the freedom to contract would be justified in order to attain a simpler and more manageable rule.
1. VANCE, INSURANCE 470-71, § 81 (3d ed. 1951).
For a discussion of the
doctrine of warranty with emphasis upon its status in Louisiana, see Comment,
22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 190 (1961).

2. VANCE, INSURANCE 470-71,

§ 81

(3d ed. 1951).

3. Morris, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Policy Litigation, 105 U. PA. L.
REV. 925 (1957).
Professor Morris also contends that waiver and estoppel have
been used by the courts as a guise to accomplish this change ia insurance
clientele.
i94. Ratcliffe v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 187 So. 329, 331 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1939). See 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 594, § 9081 (1944)
VANCE, INSURANCE § 81 (3d ed. 1.951.) ; Comment, 6 BAYLOR L. REV. 337 (1954)
29A Am. Jua. Insurance § 1009 (1960).
5. 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9081 (1944); VANCE,

INSURANCE

§§

81, 88 (3d ed. 1951); 29A AM. JUR. Insurance § 1010 (1960).
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relating to conditions of a contract can be waived ;6 thus waiver
cannot be used to extend insurance coverage to a risk not prop7
erly within the limits of a policy as written.
Generally, neither consideration nor promissory estoppel is
necessary to support a waiver, 8 although many times either or
both are present in waiver situations in the form of additional
premiums, or substantial change of position, or forbearance by
the insured in reliance upon the insurer's conduct.9 No Louisiana insurance case has been found dealing with this problem;
therefore, Louisiana is presumably in accord with the general
rule that consideration is not a necessary element of an effective
waiver. 10
6. The terms "power of avoidance" and "privilege of forfeiture" are used
synonymously throughout this discussion.
7. C. E. Carnes & Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 101 F.2d 739 (5th
Cir. 1939) (The court held that knowledge of a local agent that the insured was
using his vehicle in a manner not covered by the policy did not extend coverage
to what was not originally covered. The court stated: "It is well settled that
conditions going to the coverage or scope of a policy of insurance, as distinguished
from those furnishing a ground for forfeiture, may not be waived by implication
from conduct or action. The rule is that while an insurer may be estopped by
its conduct or its knowledge from insisting upon a forfeiture of a policy, the
coverage or restrictions on the coverage cannot be extended by the doctrine of
waiver or estoppel. . . . This is a case where the coverage is sought to be
extended. The doctrine of waiver cannot be invoked to create a primary liability,
and bring within the coverage of the policy risks not included or contemplated
by its terms." Id. at 742. From the language of the court it cannot be determined whether it was dealing with a question of waiver or a question of estoppel,
or whether the terms were considered to be interchangeable.
Apparently the
court considered the rule to be the same for waiver as well as estoppel.)
H. D. Foote Lumber Co. v. Svea Fire & Ins. Co., 179 La. 779, 155 So. 22 (1934)
(In this case the fire insurance policy specifically excluded from coverage
lumber stored within 100 feet of a building. The court held that knowledge of
a local agent after inception of the policy that lumber was being stored within
100 feet of a building did not preclude the insurer from urging lack of coverage
as a defense.) ; Jacobs v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 39 So.2d 346 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1949).
Accord, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Compania de Navegacion,
Interior, 19 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1927); New Orleans, T. & M. Ry. v. Union
Marine Ins. Co., 286 Fed. 32 (5th Cir. 1923) ; Steers v. Home Ins. Co., 38 La.
Ann. 952 (1886) ; 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9090 (1944).
See VANCE, INSURANCE 498-500, § 84 (3rd ed. 1951).
8. 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTIC 621-22, § 9087 (1944)
("The majority of jurisdictions support the doctrine that no consideration is
essential to support a waiver by an insurer; in fact, it has been a common
holding that neither consideration nor any element of estoppel need be present
in order for a waiver to exist.") ; VANCE, INSURANCE § 84 (3d ed. 1951).
9. VANCE, INSURANCE § 84 (3d ed. 1951).

10. Presumably the doctrine of consideration is recognized in Louisiana insurance cases, because it has been held that the Civil Code does not regulate
insurance contracts in absence of specific legislation. Barry v. Louisiana Ins.
Co., 12 Mart.(O.S.) 493 (La. 1822). See Nabors, Civil Law Influences Upon
the law of Insurace in Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV. 515 (1932) ; SAUNDERS,
REVISED CIVIL CODE OF lOUISIANA xviii (1909) ; Comment. 4 TUL. r,. REV. 267

(1930).
But see Brown v. Duplantier, I Mart.(N.S.) 312 (l-a. 1823).
It
should be noted that under a strict civilian theory as set forth by the Louisiana
Civil Code, consideration is not required to create a binding obligation. See
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Waiver may be express." For example, suppose that an insured breaches or fails to comply with a policy condition which
creates in the insurer a power of avoidance or privilege of forfeiture. After learning of this power or privilege, the insurer,
through an agent with proper authority, manifests to the insured, in a manner provided by the policy, that it waives the
power or privilege. The insurer cannot thereafter assert that
power or privilege because it is considered as having been
waived.
Most waivers considered in the course of insurance litigation,
however, are not express and must be implied from the insurer's
conduct or inaction. Circumstances from which a waiver may be
inferred must be such as to indicate that a relinquishment was
intended by the insurer. 12 Also the inference of waiver from
certain conduct or inaction must be reasonable. 18
It is well established in Louisiana and elsewhere that acceptance of premium payments by an insurer after receiving knowledge of facts creating a power of avoidance or privilege of forfaiture constitutes a waiver of such powers or privileges. 14 Acceptance of premiums manifests an intention to keep a policy of
insurance in force for the additional period covered by the premium payments.
Habitual acceptance of premium payments in arrears establishes a custom between the parties from which the insured may
reasonably infer a relinquishment by the insurer of the power
to avoid the policy for failure to pay premiums punctually or
for failure to insist upon formal reinstatement procedures established by the policy. 1 5 Waiver may also occur where nonpayment
LA. CIVIi CODE arts. 1779, 1893-1900 (1870).

See, generally, Smith, A Refresher
Course in Cause, 12 LoUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 2 (1951).
11. VANCE, INSURANCE 480-83, § 82 (3d ed. 1951) ; 29A Am. JUR. Insurance
§ 1015 (1960).
12. 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 594, § 9081 (1944);
VANCE, INSURANCE § 83 (3d ed. 1951) ; 29A Am. Jua. Insurance § 1009 (1960).
13. Ashley v. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co., 6 So.2d 781 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1942); Goodwin v. Federal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 180 So. 662 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1938).
14. McConnell v. Southern States Life Ins. Co., 31 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1929);
Dutton v. Harmonia Ins. Co., 191 La. 72, 184 So. 546 (1938) ; Story v. The
Hope Ins. Co., 37 La. Ann. 254 (1885) ; Wills v. Liberty Indus. Life Ins. Co.,
159 So. 141 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935) ; Cobbs v. Unity Indus. Life Ins. Co., 158
So. 263 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935); Clay v. Liberty Indus. Life Ins. Co., 157
So. 838 (La. App. 1934).

See, generally, 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND

PRACTICE § 9271 (1944); VANCE, INSURANCE 487, 489-91, § 83 (3d ed. 1951);
29A Am. JUa. Insurance § 1083 (1960).
15. Morris v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 203 La. 507, 14 So.2d 428 (1943)
Muse v. Strudwick Fair Service Ins. Co., 42 So.2d 925 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
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is due to failure of the insurer to adhere to its established custom of sending collectors to receive premium payments, even
though the policy states that such a practice is merely a courtesy, and that the insured is primarily responsible for transmitting payments to the insurer. 16 Similarly waiver of the power to
cancel a policy for failure to pay premiums in a timely manner
can be found where an insurer accepts past due premiums and
fails to notify the insured of its intention to cancel within a rea17
sonable time.
Louisiana and other jurisdictions hold that an insurer must
exercise a power of avoidance within a reasonable time or be
considered as having waived the power.' 8 Since the period of
silence or inaction must be unreasonable, there is no waiver by
inaction where the insurance agent begins procedures for a formal written waiver as required by the policy soon after being
notified of facts creating a power of avoidance in the insurer. 1"
1949); Soleyman v. Woodmen of the World, 3 So.2d 466 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1941) ; Mobley v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 167 So. 217 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936),
aff'd on rehearing, 172 So. 55 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937) ; Riley v. Life & Cas.
Ins. Co., 145 So. 33 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932) ; Bush v. Liberty Indus. Life
Ins. Co., 130 So. 839 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930) ; Graff v. Sovereign Camp,
Security Degree, W.O.W., 1 La. App. 119 (Orl. Cir. 1925); 29A Am. JUR.
Insurance § 1081 (1960); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 717(a) (1946).
An insurer's insistence upon compliance with formal reinstatement procedures
after delinquent payments may negative any intention to waive punctual payment requirements. Holloman v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 188 So. 500
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; Ratcliffe v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 187 So. 329
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939) ; Crease v. Liberty Indus. Life Ins. Co., 151 So. 89
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1933). There is no basis for waiver where conduct of the
insurer is not inconsistent with policy provisions. Therefore, punctual payment
requirements were not considered waived by a custom of accepting tardy payments under a policy which provided that acceptance of late payments constituted automatic reinstatement. Richardson v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 137
So. 370 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1931).
16. Hebert v. Woodruff's Ins. Co., 19 So.2d 290 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944)
Lewis v. Louisiana Indus. Life Ins. Co., 4 So.2d 755 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
17. Trager v. Louisiana Equitable Life Ins. Co., 31 La. Ann. 235 (1879);
Ellzey v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 40 So.2d 24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949) ; Smith
v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 178 So. 691 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937) ; Anderson
v. Life & Cas. Co., 158 So. 270 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935) ; Jones v. First Nat'l
Life, Health & Ace. Ins. Co., 8 La. App. 691 (1st Cir. 1928).
But acceptance of premiums not known at the time to be overdue does not
constitute a waiver. Ratcliffe v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 187 So. 329 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1939).
18. Trager v. Louisiana Equitable Life Ins. Co., 31 La. Ann. 235 (1879)
Boyd v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 50 So.2d 688 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951)
Ellzey v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 40 So.2d 24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949)
Monroe Air Park No. 1, Inc. v. American Aviation & Gen. Ins. Co., 41 So.2d
795 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949); Smith v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 178 So.
691 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937); Anderson v. Life & Cas. Co., 158 So. 270 (La.
App. On. Cir. 1935) ; Jones v. First Nat'l Life, Health & Ace. Ins. Co., 8 La.
App. 691 (1st Cir. 1928). See VANCE, INSURANCE § 83 (3d ed. 1951); 29A
AM. JUR. Insurance § 1076 (1960).
19. People's Bank of Donaldsonville v. National Fire Ins. Co., 130 La. 951,
58 So. 826 (1912) (Upon being notified that ownership of building insured
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. A power or privilege must be known in order to be waived.
Therefore, an insurer unaware of facts creating a power of
avoidance or privilege of forfeiture, or without reasonable basis
to know of such facts, cannot be said to waive such a power by
continuing the policy in force.2 0 Moreover, knowledge acquired
by the insurer must be sufficient to indicate that it has a power
of avoidance. 21 Notice of facts which would cause a reasonable
man to inquire further imposes a duty of investigation upon the
insurer, and failure to investigate has been held to constitute a
waiver of all powers or privileges which a reasonable search
22
would have uncovered.
Conduct after loss inconsistent with an intention to exercise
a power of avoidance constitutes a waiver of the insurer's defense under the policy. 3 Thus an offer to pay has been considered a waiver of powers and privileges known to exist at the
time ;24 special circumstances in negotiating an adjustment of a
loss may be grounds for waiver ;25 raising and repairing a vessel
with knowledge of a power to avoid has been held a waiver ;26
against fire had been changed in violation of the policy, the agent stated
that he would execute the required endorsement the next morning. Ironically
the building was damaged by fire during the night. The court properly held
that no valid waiver had been completed at the time of the loss.) ; Community
Stores of Louisiana, Inc. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 144 So. 909 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1932) (The agent of a theft insurer commenced procedure for formal waiver
consistent with the terms of the policy provision soon after being notified of a
relocation of one of the insured's stores. Before the steps had been completed,
a burglary loss occurred. The court held that the insurer had not waived the
power to avoid liability based upon relocation because both parties knew that
waiver would not be effective until the formal endorsement steps had been
completed.).
20. Whiteman v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1948)
Camors v. Union Marine Ins. Co., 104 La. 349, 28 So. 926 (1900); Allison
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 158 So. 389 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935). See 16 APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9086 (1944) ; 29A AM. JuR. Insurance § 1017
(1960).
21. Moore v. Louisiana Fire Ins. Co., 177 La. 645, 148 So. 904 (1933).
See 29A AM. JuR. Insurance § 1017 (1960).
22. Franz v. United Casualty Co., 49 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. La. 1943)
Peterson v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 148 So. 283 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1933) (dictum).
See 29A AM. JuR. Insurance §§ 1025-1027 (1960).
23. Kahmann & McMurry v. Aetna Ins. Co., 242 Fed. 20 (5th Cir. 1917)
Kettingham v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 76 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. La. 1948)
Dutton v. Harmonia Ins. Co., 191 La. 72, 184 So. 546 (1938); Roach v.
Harmonia Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 356, 145 So. 769 (1933); Vitrano v. Western
Ins. Co., 10 Orl. App. 126 (La. App. 1913) ; Finkelstein Bros. v. Virginia State
Ins. Co., 4 Orl. App. 154 (La. App. 1907). Cf. Fontenot v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 119 So.2d 588 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960). See 29A AM. Jur. Insurance
§§ 1099-1106 (1960).
24. Vitrano v. Western Ins. Co., 10 Or]. App. 126 (La. App. 1913) (the
insurer made an offer after loss with knowledge of a power of avoidance and
was precluded from asserting the power of avoidance).
25. Dutton v. Harmonia Ins. Co., 191 La. 72, 184 So. 546 (1938); Finkelstein v. Virginia State Ins. Co., 4 OrI. App. 154 (La. App. 1907).
26. Kahmann & McMurry v. Aetna Ins. Co., 242 Fed. 20 (5th Cir. 1917).
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.and retention of a chattel for an unreasonable time for repair
has been held to constitute a waiver of a known power of avoidance.2 7 Insurers may preserve their rights to urge defenses
pending investigation of losses by securing non-waiver agreements provided an unreasonable period of inaction does not
occur after making such an agreement.2

Section 651 of the

Louisiana Insurance Code 29 protects insurers and facilitates the
gathering of facts concerning claims by specifying that certain
actions after loss such as acknowledging notice of claim, furnishing forms for reporting losses, and investigating and negotiating possibilities of settlement shall not be construed as
waiver of defenses by an insurer.
Since waivers are conventional in nature, they bind the insurer only if made by an agent with actual or apparent authority.3 0 Therefore, as a general rule valid waivers must conform to policy provisions regulating the authority of agents to
waive conditions."' However, acts done by agents without authority may be ratified and limitations upon the authority of
agents may be waived or effectively enlarged by subsequent
conduct or inaction of the insurer which would estop the insurer
from denying that the agent lacked authority. 2 Also it seems
that actual or apparent authority of an agent would not be an
issue where inaction or conduct of the insurer, and not merely
action or inaction of the agent, constituted the waiver, such as
27. Roach v. Harmonia Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 356, 145 So. 769 (1933).
Accord, Kettingham v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 76 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. La.

1948) (insurer held to have waived a policy requirement that suit be filed within
twelve months after loss where the adjustor lulled the insured into inaction).
28. Sheeren v. Gulf Ins. Co., 174 So. 380 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
29. LA. R.S. 22:651 (1950), as amended and re-enacted, La. Acts 1958,
No. 125.
30. Mongeau v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 128 La. 654, 55 So.
6 (1911); Richard v. Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 114 La. 794, 38
So. 563 (1905) (an agent with authority to write and issue policies was held to
have at least apparent authority to waive policy provisions) ; Murphy v. Royal
Gipson v. First
Ins. Co., 52 La. Ann. 775, 27 So. 143 (1899) (dictum)
Nat. Life Ins. Co., 25 So.2d 844 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) (dictum) ; Diboll v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 32 La. Ann. 179 (1880). See 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 9121, 9122 (1944) ; VANCE, INSURANCE § 90 (3d ed.
1951).
31. Ponder v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 6 F.2d 300 (W.D. La. 1925)
Antoine v. Eagle & British Dominions Ins. Co., 147 La. 554, 85 So. 238 (1920)
(dictum); Dominick v. Detroit Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 147 La. 549, 85 So.
Cf. St. Landry Wholesale Mercantile Co. v. New
(dictum).
236 (1920)
Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 114 La. 146, 38 So. 87 (1905).
32. 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE-LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 9121-9122 (1944). But
an insured must be reasonable in interpreting an agent's authority. Diboll v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 32 La. Ann. 179 (1880). (an agent was held without
apparent authority to issue an antedated receipt in order to avoid lapse of a
policy. for failure to pay premiums timely).
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inaction for an unreasonable period of time after knowledge of
a power of avoidance or retention of premiums with knowledge
of a power of avoidance. An agent's knowledge obtained within
the scope of his employment is imputed to the insurer even
though the agent may not have authority to waive policy conditions.33
The parol evidence rule excludes proof of waivers executed
prior to or contemporaneously with a written contract which
would contradict or vary the terms of the written contract of
insurance. 84 But waivers subsequent to the issuance of an insurance policy may be proved by parol evidence because parties

may alter or even abandon an existing, written contract by parol
agreement.- Also it should be noted that the parol evidence
rule applies only to terms of a contract as distinguished from
provisions which regulate the inception of a policy as a binding
contractv 6 Thus, waivers of provisions regulating the inception
of a policy are provable by parol evidence.
Estoppel
The type of estoppel discussed in this Comment, as distinguished from promissory estoppel, was conceived as an equitable
device to prevent one from asserting rights, privileges, or powers
under conditions which would make it inequitable for him to
do so. 37 More specifically, equitable estoppel in insurance law
may be urged by a party to an insurance contract when he has

reasonably relied to his detriment upon an inaccurate or misleading representation of fact made by the other party.88 The
33. 16 APPLEMAN, INSUBANCE LAW AND
INSURANCE 541, 546, § 90 (3d ed. 1951).

PRACTICE

§ 9101

(1944) ; VANcz,

34. Bell v. The Western Marine and Fire Ins. Co., 5 Rob. 423 (La. 1843);
Bell v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 5 Rob. 446 (La. 1843). Accord, New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Stewart, 69 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1934).
See VANCE, INSURANCE § 90
(3d ed. 1951). See, generally, MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 210-222 (1954). Language of the Louisiana parol evidence statutes indicates that they do not apply to
insurance contracts. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2275-2283 (1870) ; LA. R.S. 15:437
(1950). Therefore, presumably the common law parol evidence rule applies in
light of the rule that insurance cases are governed by the general commercial
law in absence of specific Louisiana legislation. Barry v. Louisiana Ins. Co.,
12 Mart. (O.S.) 493 (La. 1822). See Nabors, Civil Law Influences Upon the
Law of Insurance in Louisiana, 6 TiL. L. REV. 515 (1932) ; SAUNDERS, REVISED
CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA xviii (1909) ; Comment, 4 TUL. L. REV. 267 (1930).

35. VANCE, INSURANCE § 90 (3d ed. 1951) ; 29A Am. JUR. Insurance § 1918
(1960).
36. VANCE, INSURANCE § 90 (3d ed. 1951).
37. Id. § 86.
38. Goodwin v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 180 So. 662, 666 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1938). Accord, McDaniel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 166 So. 889 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1936). See 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 9081, 9088
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representation may be express or implied by conduct or inaction.3 9 No consent by either party is necessary, 40 and generally

the authority of an agent whose conduct gives rise to estoppel
is immaterial as long as he is acting within the course or scope

of his employment. 41 Detrimental reliance can be based upon

the assumption that the insured would have procured other
42
coverage had he known that the insurer could avoid liability.
In Louisiana as in other jurisdictions, an insurer who issues
a policy with actual or imputed knowledge of a power of avoidance, or under such circumstances that it should have known

or discovered the power, will be held estopped to assert the
power of avoidance where the insured reasonably relies upon
such conduct to his detriment. 43 Issuing a policy with knowledge
(1944); VANCE, INSURANCE §§81, 88 (3d ed. 1951); Morris, Waiver and
Estoppel in Insurance Policy Litigation, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1957);
Comment, 6 BAYLOR L. REV. 337 (1954).
39. 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9088 (1944); VANCE,
INSURANCE § 89 (3d ed. 1951).
40. 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9081 (1944); VANCE,
INSURANCE § 88 (3d ed. 1951).

41. 16

APPLEMAN,

INSURANCE LAW AND

PRACTICE

§§ 9101, 9121 (1944);

INSURANCE § 90 (3d ed. 1951). Contra dictum in Dominick v. Detroit
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 147 La. 549, 85 So. 236, 238 (1920) : "Our brethren of
the Court of Appeal drew a distinction between an express waiver and such
conduct on the part of the local agent as would lull the insured into a false
confidence, and thus furnish ground for estoppel. Our brethren overlooked the
fact that what the agent could not do by an express consent he could not do by
any conduct such as would furnish ground for an estoppel, and thereby accomplish the same result."
42. VANCE, INSURANCE § 88 (3d ed. 1951).
43. Stovall v. Empire State Ins. Co., 215 La. 100, 39 So.2d 837 (1949);
Quinones v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 209 La. 76, 24 So.2d 270 (1945) ; Hardy v.
Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 172 La. 500, 134 So. 407 (1931); Gitz Sash
Factory, Inc. v. Union Ins. Soc'y, 160 La. 381, 107 So. 232 (1926) ; Corporation
of Roman Catholic Church v. Royal Ins. Co., 158 La. 601, 104 So. 383 (1925)
Mongeau v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 128 La. 654, 55 So. 6 (1911);
Union Nat'l Bank v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 52 La. Ann. 36, 26 So. 800
(1898) ; Michael v. Mut. Ins. Co., 10 La. Ann. 737 (1855) ; Maggio v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 102 So.2d 505 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) ; appeal after
trial on merits, 123 So.2d 901 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Pacific Fin. Co. v.
Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 45 So.2d 378 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950) ; Gipson v.
First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 25 So.2d 844 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946); Jacobs v.
Southern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 21 So.2d 173 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945); Lapeyrouse v. Orleans Indus. Life, Health, Ace. & Burial Benefit Ins. Co., 4 So.2d
569 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941) ; Bordelon v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 187
So. 112 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939); Demary v. Royal Indem. Co., 182 So. 389
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1938); Succession of Dekan v. Life Ins. Co., 172 So. 37
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937); Winders v. Co-op. Burial Ass'n, 157 So. 320 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1934); Breland v. Great States Ins. Co., 150 So. 313 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1933) ; Pizillio v. City of New York Ins. Co., 150 So. 106 (La. App. ]st
Cir. 1933) ; James v. Community Burial Service Corp., 5 La. App. 633 (Orl. Cir.
1927) ; Tarver v. People's Fire Ins. Co., 6 Orl. App. 59 (La. App. 1908). Dicta
contra, Martin v. First Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 143 La. 631, 79 So. 171 (1918).
See 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 9088, 9251 (1944) ; VANCE,
INSURANCE §§ 88-89 (3d ed. 1951).
VANCE,

210
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of certain facts giving rise to a power of avoidance is considered
an implied representation that the policy is not void or voidable
because of those facts. 4 Generally, an insurer must investigate
for possible powers of avoidance where it has actual or imputed
notice of circumstances which would lead one reasonably to in45
vestigate further.
In other jurisdictions it has been held that equitable estoppel
can arise during the existence of an insurance contract, although
no Louisiana cases have been found considering this question.
Generally, this occurs where an agent represents a fact, expressly or impliedly, such as an interpretation of a policy condition, or that certain action has been taken in accordance with
46
terms of the policy.
Errors made by agents in filling out applications for insurance will preclude the insurer from urging any defense based
upon the inaccurate information in the application. 47 It would
be inequitable to hold the insured responsible for the conduct
of an agent of the insurer in such cases. It has been stated that
these situations constitute an exception to the rule that a party
48
is presumed to have read what he is signing.
Estoppel is an equitable remedy and is not available to one
who does not have clean hands. 49 Therefore, if collusion exists
between an agent and an insured in attempting to defraud an
insurer, 5° or in absence of collusion if the insured is in bad
faith, the insured cannot urge estoppel. 5 '
A special provision of the Louisiana Insurance Code 52 pro44. 16 Ai'PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9088 (1944) ; VANCE,
INSURANCE § 88 (3d ed. 1951).
45. 16 API'LEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 626,
9088 (1944) ; 29A
AM. JUN. Insurance § 1026 (1960).

§

46. 16 AP1'LEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 91.68 (1944) ; VANCE, IN§ 88 (3d ed. 1951).

SURANCE

47. Telford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 227 La. 855, 80 So.2d 711 (1955)
Miller v. Preferred Life Ins. Co., 107 So.2d 323 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958). See
VANCE, INSURANCE § 89 (3d ed. 1951); 29A AM. JUa. Insurance §§ 1057-1071
(1960).
48. National Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 32 So.2d 490 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1947) (dictum); Note, 27 COLUM. L. REv. 330 (1927).
49. VANCE,

INSURANCE

§ 89

(3d

ed. 1951) ; 29A

Am. JUR.

Insurance

§§

1068-1071 (1960).
50. Shuff v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 164 La. 741, 114 So. 637 (1927) ; Strudwick Funeral Home v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 176 So. 891 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1937) (dictum) ; Ports v. Tharp-Sontheimer Indus. Life & Burial Ins.
Co., 173 So. 205 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937); Lucas v. American Bankers' Ins.
Co., 141 So. 394 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
51. Harris v. Guaranty Income Life Ins. Co., 226 La. 152, 75 So.2d 227
(1954).
52. LA. R.S. 22:692 (1950) : "No policy of fire insurance issued by any in-
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vides that a fire insurer cannot urge violation of any representation, warranty, or condition to avoid liability under the policy
if any officer or agent of the insurer had knowledge of pertinent
facts constituting a violation, unless the officers or agents acted
fraudulently. The operation of this statutory provision is similar
to equitable estoppel. It should be noted here, however, that
reliance by the insured to his detriment is not required in order
for this statutory provision to be available.
Reasons for the Confusion of Waiver and Estoppel
Much confusion surrounds the principles of waiver and
estoppel in insurance law. 53 Many courts have used the two
terms interchangeably, 54 while others have considered waiver
and estoppel as being complementary, that is, that waiver must
be supported by estoppel, or estoppel is the result of waiver. 55
However, many decisions and several writers in the field have
recognized that waiver and estoppel are distinct and independent
concepts. 56 There are several possible sources of this confusion.
surer on property in this state shall hereafter -be declared void by the insurer

for the breach of any representation, warranty or condition contained in the said
policy or in the application therefor. Such breach shall not avail the insurer to
avoid liability unless such breach (1) shall exist at the time of the loss, and be
either such a breach as would increase either the moral or physical hazard under
the policy, or (2) shall be such a breach as would be a violation of a warranty
or condition requiring the insurer to take and keep inventories and books showing
a record of his business. Notwithstanding the above provisions of this Section,
such a breach shall not afford a defense to a suit on the policy if the fact or

facts constituting such a breach existing [existed] at the time of the issuance
of, the policy and were, at such time, known to the insurer or to any of his or
its officers or agents, or if the fact or facts constituting such a breach existed
at the time of the loss and were, at such time, known to the insurer or to any
of his or its officers or agents, except in case of fraud on the part of such officer
or agent or the insured, or collusion between such officer or agent and the insured.
Amended and re-enacted Acts 1958, No. 125." (Emphasis added.)
53. See 16 APPLEMIAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 597, § 9081 (1944)

VANCE, INSURANCE 471, § 81 (3d ed. 1951) ("There can be no doubt that sad
confusion has resulted from the use of these adapted tools.") ; 29A AM. JUr.
Insurance § 1010 (1960).
54. E.g., Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n, 183 U.S. 308
(1902) ; Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wolff, 95 U.S. 326 (1877); Commercial
Standard Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 159 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1947) ; C. E. Carnes &
Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 101 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1939); Morris v.
Sovereign Camp, 203 La. 507, 14 So.2d 428 (1943)
Gitz Sash Factory, Inc. v.
Union Ins. Soc'y, 160 La. 381, 107 So. 232 (1926) ;Martin v. First Nat'l Fire
Ins. Co., 143 La. 631, 79 So. 171 (1918) ; Gipson v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
25 So.2d 844 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) ; Hebert v. Woodruff's Ins. Co., 19 So.2d
290 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944); Phenix Ins. Co. v. Grove, 215 Ill. 299, 74 N.E.
141 (1905); Wisdom v. Farm Prop. Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 199 Iowa 408, 202 N.W.
5 (1925) ;McCracken v. Car & Gen. Ins. Corp., 94 N.H. 474, 55 A.2d 894 (1947).
55. E.g., Coursey v. International Harvester Co., 109 F.2d 774 (10th Cir.
1940); Corporation of Roman Catholic Church v. Royal Ins. Co., 158 La. 601,
104 So. 383 (1925) ;Muse v. Strudwick Fair Service Ins. Co., 42 So.2d 925 (La.
App. Orl.. Cir. 1949).
56. E.g., Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 222
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Both waiver and estoppel operate to allow recovery on insurance

policies ;57 thus the need for differentiation in a given case is
diminished. Another factor lending to the confusion is that

waiver is generally accompanied by promissory estoppel which
is easily confused with equitable estoppel, although the two are
separate and distinct doctrines and serve different purposes.8 8
Also tending to cause confusion is the difficulty of making
the distinction in many cases where implied waiver or estoppel
is involved. 59 For example, when an insurer has knowledge of
a power of avoidance and subsequently issues a policy,60 or
accepts premium payments, or fails to exercise the power of
avoidance within a reasonable time, an intention to waive policy
conditions or an estoppel by a representation that the policy is
effective in spite of the facts creating the power of avoidance

may be inferred. Whether such conduct is properly a waiver or
an estoppel must be determined by considering other circum-

stances indicating the intentions manifested by the parties. An
intention to waive must be manifest in order for waiver to be
properly inferred, whereas no such intention is necessary for
estoppel.
Although either waiver or estoppel has the same effect, that
is, allowing recovery on a policy of insurance, the distinction
(1871); Williams v. Unity Indus. Life Ins. Co., 181 So. 210 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1938); Seavey v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 232, 69 N.W.2d 889, 52 A.L.R.2d 1144
(1955); A. Perley Fitch Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 99 N.H. 1, 104 A.2d 511,
49 A.L.R.2d 156 (1954); Baird v. Fidelity-Phenix Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 653, 162
S.W.2d 384 (1942); Mears v. Farmers Co-op. Fire Ins. Co., 112 Vt. 519, 28
A.2d 699 (1942). See 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9081
(1944); VANCE, INSURANCE § 81 (3d ed. 1951); Comment, 6 BAYLOR L. RIv.

337 (1954); 29A AM. JUR. Insurance §§ 1008-1010 (1960).
57. 16 APPLEXAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9081 (1944); VANciU,
INSURANCE 1 81 (3d ed. 1951).
58. VANCE, INSURANCE 472, § 81 (3d ed. 1951). Promissory estoppel is used

to make promises enforceable in absence of consideration in the form of a bargained-for equivalent where one has relied to his detriment upon a promise by
another. It differs from equitable estoppel in that the latter involves detrimental
reliance upon a misleading representation of fact by another. See 1 CoRniw,
CONTRACTS §1 114, 194-195 (1950).
59. 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9081 (1944).
60. Note that waiver in such a situation could not be proved by parol evidence because that rule excludes proof of parol agreements prior to or contemporaneously with the inception of a written contract which attempts to vary
or modify provisions of the written agreement. See discussion page 208 supra. The
general parol evidence rule is apparently applicable to Louisiana insurance cases
in view of the rule that the general commercial law, not the Civil Code, governs
Louisiana insurance cases in absence of specific legislation on the subject. Barry
v. Louisiana Ins. Co., 12 Mart. (O.S.) 493 (La. 1882). See Nabors, Civil Laow
Influences Upon the Law of Insurance in Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REv. 515 (1932) ;
SAUNDERS, REVISED CrVI CODE Or LOUISIANA xviii (1909); Comment, 4 TuL.
L. REv. 267 (1930). But see Brown v. Duplantier, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 312 (1823).
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between the two should be maintained and preserved. 61 Where
parol evidence or authority of an agent is involved, correct disposition of a case may very well depend upon properly distin-

guishing between waiver and estoppel.2 Parol evidence is irrelevant for estoppel, and an agent need only be acting within the
scope of his employment, whereas waiver requires a considera-

tion of both elements in most cases.

8

Conclusion
Waiver is conventional in nature, whereas estoppel is merely
an equitable device. Waiver generally requires an intention and

consent. Proof of a waiver is subject to the parol evidence rule,
and as a general rule it must be shown that the agent had actual
or apparent authority to waive policy conditions. Estoppel does
not require consent or intention since it is based on detrimental
reliance. It is generally held that the parol evidence rule is not
properly applicable to exclude proof of estoppel, 4 although no
Louisiana appellate court decision has been found involving this
question. An agent need not have actual or apparent authority
to waive policy provisions, but need only be acting within the
scope of his employment in order to give rise to estoppel. Consideration is not required either for waiver or estoppel. An
insured who is in bad faith, who is unreasonable in interpreting
an insurer's conduct or inaction as a waiver, or who is unreasonable in relying upon an insurer's conduct or inaction can assert
61. 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9081 (1944); VANCE,
INSURANCE

§ 81 (3d ed. 1951).

62. E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 69 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1934)
seems clearly in error on this point where it was held that parol evidence was
inadmissible to show that an agent of the insurer filled out the application for
life insurance. To the same effect see Lumber Underwriters v. Rife, 237 U.S.
605 (1915) ; Batchelder v. Queen Ins. Co., 135 Mass. 449 (1883). It is submitted
that such decisions resulted from failure to properly distinguish between waiver
and estoppel.
63. It should be pointed out that no Louisiana insurance case decided by an
appellate court has been found discussing consideration in relation to waiver and
estoppel.
64. E.g., Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 222
(1871) ; Iverson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 151 Cal. 746, 91 Pac. 609 (1907) ;
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Patten, 151 Ga. 185, 106 S.E. 183 (1921) ; Forwood
Y. Prudential Ins. Co., 117 Md. 254, 83 Atl. 169 (1912) ; Tuttle v. Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 58 Mont. 121, 190 Pac. 993, 16 A.L.R. 601 (1920) ; Wolf v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 62 R.I. 270, 4 A.2d 897 (1939) ; Salvate v. Firemen's Ins.
Co., 42 R.I. 433, 108 Atl. 579 (1920). See VANCE, INSURANCE § 87 (3d ed.
1951). Contra, Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n, 183 U.S. 308
(1902); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U.S. 519 (1886) ; Harris v.
North Am. Ins. Co., 190 Mass. 361, 77 N.E. 493 (1906) ; Thomas v. Commercial
Union Assur. Co., 162 Mass. 29, 37 N.E. 672 (1894) ; Gillan v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y, 143 Neb. 647, 10 N.W.2d 693 (1943), vacating a former opinion,
142 Neb. 497, 6 N.W.2d 782 (1942).
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neither waiver nor estoppel. Likewise, neither waiver nor estoppel is available to an insured in bad faith.
Robert A. Hawthorne, Jr.

Distribution of a Limited Insurance Fund to
Multiple Claimants
The problem of how to distribute a fund,, insufficient to
satisfy all claims, is encountered in various areas of the law,
such as in bankruptcy and in the administration of insolvent
successions. In these instances, the courts with the aid of legis-

lation have developed rather well-settled methods of distribution. However, procedures for distributing limited insurance
funds among multiple claimants are not so clearcut, and except in rare instances where there is legislation on the matter'

the insurer distributes the fund subject to certain obligations
to the insured. The purpose of this Comment is to examine
the problems involved where there are multiple claims to limited
insurance funds, to review current methods of distribution, and

to discuss suggested alternative procedures. This discussion contemplates an insurance fund to be distributed according to the
terms of the Standard Automobile Liability Policy, 2 although
much of the discussion is pertinent to other types of casualty
insurance policies.
The Settlement Process
Single claims to the insurance fund. Most of the leading
cases which consider the legal relations between insurer, insured,
1. A New York statute makes provision for allocating proceeds of insurance
policies held by certain carriers of passengers for hire. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC

LAW § 17(1). This provision states that the policy must require payment of
specified limits "to be apportioned ratably among the judgment creditors according to the amount of their respective judgments." It has been held that the proper
form of remedy under this statute, when several persons have been killed or
injured as the result of a single accident and the wrongdoer is insolvent, is an
inequitable proceeding by a judgment creditor suing in his own behalf and in behalf of others similarly situated,to administer the proceeds of the policy as a fund
created by statute for ratable protection. Bleimeyer v. Public Serv. Mut. Cas.
Ins. Corp., 250 N.Y. 264, 165 N.E. 286 (1929).
2. STANDARD AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY, NATIONAL BUREAU OF CASUALTY
UNDERWRITERS

AND
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(1955).
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See Faude,
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BASIC
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The 1955 Revisions of the

Standard Automobile Policy: Coverage: Insuring Agreements and Exclusions, in
Section of Insurance Law, 1955 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS

(1956).
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